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Pohjola  (1983)  derives  open-loop  Stackelberg  solutions  for  the  Lancaster  (1973)  model  of 
capitalism  and  compares  the  outcomes  with  the  open-loop  Nash  outcome.  Due  to  a  shortcoming 
in  the  analysis  only  one  open-loop  Stackelberg  solution  with  the  workers  as  leader  was  found. 
This  note  shows  that  there  are  in  fact  infinitely  many  solutions.  Furthermore,  these  solutions  can 
be  derived  with  standard  optimal  control  techniques. 
1.  Introduction 
Lancaster  (1973)  described  capitalism  as  a  differential  game  between 
workers  and  capitalists  in  which  the  workers  determine  their  share  of 
consumption  in  total  output  whereas  the  capitalists  divide  the  remainder  over 
investment  and  their  own  consumption.  The  purpose  was  to  show  the 
dynamic  inefficiency  of  capitalism  by  comparing  the  noncooperative  Nash 
outcome  with  the  social  optimum.  Hoe1  (1978)  extended  this  analysis  by 
considering  not  only  the  social  optimum  but  the  whole  set  of  Pareto  efficient 
solutions. 
Pohjola  (1983)  derived  the  open-loop  Stackelberg  solutions  for  the  Lan- 
caster  model  of  capitalism  under  both  workers’  and  capitalists’  leadership.  By 
comparing  these  outcomes  with  the  open-loop  Nash  outcome  it  was  shown 
that  capitalism  is  in  a  stalemate,  because  both  classes  would  prefer  to  act  as 
the  follower  in  the  Stackelberg  game.  BaSar,  Haurie,  and  Ricci  (1985)  later 
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analysed  the  feedback  outcomes  of  the  Lancaster  game  to  show  the  impact  of 
state  information  and  the  loss  of  commitment. 
Following  Wishart  and  Olsder  (19791,  Pohjola  (1983)  used  generalised 
functions  to  handle  the  technical  difficulties,  but  an  error  was  made  in  the 
analysis.  As  a  consequence  of  this  only  one  open-loop  Stackelberg  solution 
was  found  in  each  of  the  two  cases.  In  this  note  it  is  shown  that  there  are  in 
fact  infinitely  many  solutions  for  the  most  probable  parameter  values.  It  is 
also  shown  that  these  solutions  can  be  derived  with  standard  optimal  control 
techniques.  The  values  of  the  objective  functions  are  the  same  for  all 
solutions,  so  that  the  remainder  of  the  analysis  in  Pohjola  (1983)  still  stands. 
In  order  to  keep  the  note  short  only  the  game  with  the  workers  as  leader  is 
reconsidered. 
Section  2  summarizes  the  Lancaster  model  of  capitalism  and  derives  by 
means  of  standard  optimal  control  techniques  the  open-loop  Stackelberg 
solutions  under  workers’  leadership.  Section  3 shows  why  Pohjola  (19831  only 
found  one  solution.  Section  4  is  a  short  conclusion. 
2.  Open-loop  Stackelberg  solutions  of  the  Lancaster  game 
The  workers  control  their  consumption  rate  ui  and  maximise  their  total 
consumption  over  a  planning  period 
/ ‘q(t)aK(t)  dt, 
0  (1) 
where  K  is  the  capital  stock  and  a  denotes  the  output-capital  ratio.  It  is 
assumed  that  c<u,(t)<b,  t~[o,T],  with  O<c<b  and  OS<b<l.  The 
capitalists  control  the  investment  rate  uz  w.r.t.  the  remaining  output  (0  I 
u,(t)  I  1,  t E  [0, T])  and  maximise  their  total  consumption  over  the  planning 
period 
jT[l-z~(t)][l-u2(t)]uK(t)dt. 
0  (2) 
The  capital  accumulation  can  be  written  as 
k(t)  = [l -q(t)]+(t)aK(t),  K(0)  =  K,.  (3) 
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Suppose  that  the  workers  are  the  leader  in  the  Stackelberg  game  and  the 
capitalists  are  the  follower.  The  Hamiltonian  function  for  the  rational  reac- 
tion  of  the  capitalists  is  given  by 
H,(K,u,,Y,,t):=[l-u,(t)]{l-u,+Y,u,)aK.  (4) 
Pontryagin’s  maximum  principle  yields  the  necessary  conditions  (3), 
i 
1 
&(t)  = 
if  y2(t)  >  1, 
0  if  y*(t)  <  1,  (5) 
and 
Y,(t)  =  -[I  -u,(t)]{l-W)  +Y2U)W)]C 
Y,(T)  =  0.  (6) 
According  to  Arrow’s  sufficiency  theorem  [see,  e.g.,  Seierstad  and  Sydsaeter 
(1987,  p.  107)],  these  conditions  are  also  sufficient.  The  costate  y,  is continu- 
ous,  and  monotonically  decreasing  because  Y2(t)  <  0,  t E (0, T).  It  follows 
that  there  are  two  possibilities: 
(1)  Y,(O)  I  1 
In  this  case  u,(t)  =  0,  t E  (0, T],  so  that  there  is  no  investment  and  no 
capital  accumulation.  This  can  occur  when  the  workers  claim  a  too  large 
consumption  rate  for  themselves  or  when  there  is  too  little  time  to  take 
advantage  of  the  investment.  The  adjoint  system  (6)  yields  that  the  integral  of 
ui  over  the  time  interval  [O, T]  must  be  bigger  than  or  equal  to  T -  l/a.  For 
T  sufficiently  large  [T  >  l/a(l  -  6)],  this  case  can  be  ruled  out,  because 
u,(t)  I  b,  t E  [O, Tl. 
(2)  y,(O)  >  1 
In  this  case  there  is a  point  in  time  i2  with  y2(i2)  =  1, where  the  capitalists 
switch  from  full  investment  u,(t)  =  1,  t E  [0, t^,>, to  no  investment  u,(t)  =  0, 
t E (t^,, T]. 
The  rational  reaction  of  the  capitalists  leads  to  the  following  constraints 
for  the  maximisation  problem  of  the  workers: 
(i)  Before  i2  there  is  capital  accumulation  according  to 
k(t)  = [l  -LQ(t)]aK(t),  K(O)  =&I, 
and  after  f2  the  capital  stock  is  fixed:  K( t >  =  K( r2),  t E [ T2, T]. 
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(ii)  After  tz  the  consumption  rate  u1  has  to  satisfy 





The  objective  functional  of  the  workers  becomes 
(8) 
(9) 
The  workers  have  to  choose  u,(t),  t E [O, ?,I,  and  iz  E (0, T)  in  order  to 
maximise  (9)  subject  to  (71,  and  have  to  satisfy  the  constraint  (8).  The 
maximisation  problem  is  a  simple  optimal  control  problem  with  a scrap  value 
and  a  variable  final  time.  The  Hamiltonian  function  for  this  maximisation 
problem  is  given  by 
H1(K,ul,Y*,t):=  {u,  +Y,[l-%l)~~.  (10) 
Necessary  and  sufficient  conditions  [see,  e.g.,  Seierstad  and  Sydsaeter  (1987, 
pp.  397-39911  for  the  optimum  are  (7), 
i 
b 
i?,(t)  = 
if  y,(t)  <  1, 
c  if  y,(r)  >  1,  (11) 
j,(t)  = -{wi  +y,(t)[l  -w)l}~~ 
y&)  =a(T-f;)  -  1,  (12) 
and 
{u(T-~~)-2}[l-~&(i,)]u~(~~)=O.  (13) 
From  (13)  it  follows  that 
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function  a*,  given  by  (51,  has  a  time  derivative  equal  to  the  delta  function 
-s(t  -  i2).  One  error  is  made  in  the  analysis.  In  contrast  to  what  is 
presented  in  table  4 [Pohjola  (1983,  p.  183)],  the  costate  z  [Pohjola  (1983,  eq. 
(24111 is constant  and  equal  to  -y,(i,)~(?z)  on  the  whole  time  interval  (f,,  Tl 
[see,  e.g.,  Gel’fand  and  Shilov  (1964)].  Note  that  the  costate  y,  here  is  not 
the  same  as  in  section  2 of  this  note.  It  follows  that  the  switching  function  B 
[Pohjola  (1983,  eq.  (27))]  is  constant  and  equal  to  [l  -JJ,(?~)]~(?~)  on  the 
whole  time  interval  <t^,, T].  Therefore  the  switching  function  B  cannot 
determine  a  switch  in  the  optimal  consumption  rate  Li, in  this  time  interval. 
One  can  proceed  as  follows.  The  adjoint  systems  for  y,  and  y,  [Pohjola 
(1983,  eqs.  (19),  (23))]  become  on  the  time  interval  [t^,, Tl 
j2(t)  =  -a[1  -qq], 
and 
9,(t)  = -aLi,( 
There  are  three  possibilities: 
(1)  B(t)  >  0,  t E Ct;,  Tl  or  y,(i,)  <  1, so  that  l;,(t)  =  b,  t E <i,,  Tl. 
This  leads  to  a  contradiction  with  b >  0.5. 
(2)  B(t)  =  0,  t E  <t^,, Tl  or  yi(t;>  =  1. 
This  yields  t*, =  T -  2/a  and  finally  leads  to  the  multiple  open-loop 
Stackelberg  solutions  for  c I  0.5,  given  by  (15). 
(3)  B(t)  <  0,  t E <r;,  T]  or  y,(&>  >  1, so  that  z?,(t)  =  c,  t E Ct^,,  T]. 
This  yields  iz  =  T -  l/&l  -  c)  and  finally  leads  to  the  single  open-loop 
Stackelberg  solution  for  c >  0.5,  given  by  (17). 
4.  Conclusion 
This  note  shows  that  there  are  infinitely  many  open-loop  Stackelberg 
solutions  for  the  Lancaster  model  of  capitalism  under  workers’  leadership. 
Furthermore,  it  is  shown  that  it  is  not  necessary  to  employ  optimal  control 
theory  in  the  space  of  generalised  functions,  because  the  problem  of  the 
leader  can  be  seen  as  a  simple  optimal  control  problem  with  a  scrap  value 
and  a variable  final  time. A.  de  Zeeuw,  Note  on Pohjola  (1983)  145 
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